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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
nka CAROLYN BOIES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF
CROSS-APPELLANT

CASS BETTINGER,

Case No. 88-0559-CA

Defendant-Appellant.

I. JURISDICTION
This is a cross-appeal from an appeal filed by Plaintiff.
Jurisdiction in the matter is conferred up to this Court pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(q).
II.

ADDENDUM

Attached hereto are photocopies of Utah Code Annotated §§151-1 and 78-37-4.
DATED this

t*\

«'•

March, 1989.

MCDbNALD & BULLEN

A-H-A
« JcDonald
Attorney for Defendant-Appeii ant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the
served a copy of the foregoing

|^\

day of March, 1989, I

Supplement

to Brief of Cross-

Appellant by causing said document to be personally delivered to
the following named persons at the following addresses:
Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for PIaintdTBr-Respondent
426 South 500 Easjr
Salt Lake City, l/T 84102
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TITLE 15
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS
IN GENERAL
Chapter
1. Interest.
2. Legal Capacity of Children.
3. Interparty Agreements.
4. Joint Obligations.
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed].
6. Prompt Payment Act.
7. Registered Public Obligations Act.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section
15-1-1.

Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate.
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed.

Section
15-1-3. Calculated by the year.
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed.

15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate.
(1) Except when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. Nothing in this section may
be construed to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge which by law
applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made
before May 14, 1981.
(2) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action.
History: L- 1907, ch. 46, § 1; CJL 1907,
S 1241; CJL 1917, $ 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1;
L. 1935, ch. 42, $ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981,
ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment increased the rate in the first sentence
from 6% to 10%; and changed the date at the
end of the last sentence from 1907 to 1981.
The 1985 amendment designated the existing language as Subsection (1); inserted
"Except when parties to a lawful contract
agree on a specified rate of interest" at the beginning of Subsection (1); substituted "chose in
action" near end of first sentence of Subsection
(1) for "things in action**; substituted "Nothing

in this section may be construed to in any way"
at beginning of second sentence of Subsection
(1) for "But nothing herein contained shall be
so construed as to in any way"; substituted
"May 14,1981** at the end of Subsection (1) for
"the 14th day of May 1981**; and added Subsection (2).
Cros8-References. — Pawnbrokers, maximum charges by, § 11-6-4.
Payment of interest as extending statute of
limitations, § 78-12-44.
Rate where unspecified in instrument,
§ 70A-3-118.
Regulation by special laws prohibited, Utah
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26.

742

78-37-4

JLDICUL CODE

78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys.
If there is surplus money remaining after payment of the amount due on the
mortgage, hen or encumbrance, with costs, the court may cause the same to be
paid to the person entitled to it, and in the meantime mav direct it to be
deposited in court
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, * 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-4
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Junior mortgagee.
Junior mortgagee, who was made party to
foreclosure suit by senior mortgagee, and who
was bound by decree which barred him from
any right in property and barred all equity of

redemption in property, was not precluded
from claiming surplus from foreclosure sale b>
reason of failure to assert his rights by cross
bill or otherwise Cowan v Stoker, 100 Utah
377, 115 P 2d 153 (1941)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am Jur. 2d Mortgages
*} 930 et seq

C.J.S. — 59 C.J S Mortgages § 799
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 567

78-37-5. Sales — Wh£n debt due in installments.
If the debt for which the mortgage, lien or encumbrance is held is not all
due, then as soon as sufficient of the property has been sold to pay the amount
due, with costs, the sale must cease, and afterwards, as often as more becomes
due on principal or interest, the court may, on motion, order more to be sold.
But if the property cannot be sold in portions without injury to the parties, the
whole may be ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire debt and
costs paid, but there shall be a rebate of interest where such rebate is proper.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, £ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-5.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Motion for further proceedings.
—Notice.
Service.
Notice of motion for farther foreclosure and
sale need not he served on mortgagor's judg-

ment creditor, although later redeemed from
original sale, but only on attorney for mortgagor. Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley Loan & Trust
Co., 20 Utah 103,57 P. 845, 77 Am. St. R. 902
(1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 556.

558

C J . a — 69 CJ.S. Mortgages § 730.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 512.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
nka CAROLYN BOIES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT

vs.
Case No. 88-0559-CA
CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Respondent-Cross-Appellant,
referred

to

as

"Defendant),

Cass

submits

support of his cross appeal.

Bettinger
the

(hereinafter

following

brief

in

Inasmuch as no brief has been

submitted in support of Appellant's appeal (assigned case number
88-0297-CA) no responses is made to the issues raised by said
appeal.

Appellant will be hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff".
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following issues are presented to the Court for review:
(a)
responsible

Is a person
for costs

holding
of

a lien

improvement

on
and

real
costs

property
of

sale

incurred by the owner of the real property after the lien

1

arises so that the owner may deduct such costs

from

the

indebtedness secured by the lien?
(b)
for

the

Is a creditor entitled to interest on indebtedness
period

that

the

indebtedness

remains

unpaid

in

circumstances where the agreement between the parties and
the decree incorporating the agreement make no mention of
interest?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Defendant submits that the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
§15-1-1

are determinative of the issues relating

to interest.

This section provides as follows:
"Interest rates
Contracted rate.

-

Legal

rate-

(1)
Except when parties to a
l a w f u l c o n t r a c t a g r e e on a
specified rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods,
or chose in action shall be 10% per
annum..."
STATEMENT OF CASE
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on August 14,
1980.

The decree awarded the marital domicile of the parties to

Plaintiff, subject to a lien in favor of Defendant.
Shortly after the sale of the marital domicile on August 13,
1987, a dispute arose as to the amount of the sale proceeds to
which each party was entitled.

When it appeared that the parties

2

were unable to resolve the dispute by negotiation, Defendant
filed a motion with the lower court to resolve the dispute.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable David
S. Young, Third District Court Judge, on February 9, 1988.

On

February 18, 1988, Judge Young issued a Memorandum Decision with
respect to the issues raised by the parties.

The Memorandum

Decision was later incorporated into an Order dated March 11,
1988 (hereinafter "subject Order").

The subject Order is the

basis of Plaintiff's appeal and Defendant's cross appeal.
On March 18, 1988, Defendant filed a motion, pursuant to
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the subject
Order or grant a new trial.

However, before the lower Court made

a decision on the Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff filed a premature
Notice of Appeal with this Court on May 5, 1988 (Court of Appeals
No. 88-0297 CA).

The lower Court denied Defendant's Rule 59

motion by Order dated September 13, 1988.

Defendant thereafter

filed this cross appeal on September 26, 1988.
Plaintiff has not yet filed a brief in support of her appeal
filed on May 5, 1988 (Case No. 88-0297-CA).

Thus, Defendant

cannot respond to the issues raised by Plaintiff in her appeal as
directed by Rule 24(h), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

A

motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal in Case No. 88-0297-CA is
filed with this brief.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Decree of Divorce in this action entered on August 14,
1980, clearly provided that Plaintiff was to be awarded the
3

ownership of the family home subject to a lien in favor of
Defendant.

The relevant paragraph of the Decree is quoted on

page 7, infra.

The Decree further provided that the lien in

favor of Defendant was "forecloseable" when the youngest child
reached

18, or when the home was

sold

or when

Plaintiff

remarried.
Plaintiff remarried on August 14, 1984 (Tr. 34).

This was

the first occurrence of an event making the lien to Defendant due
and payable.
Subsequent to Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff demonstrated
her clear understanding that she was the sole owner of the home
and that Defendant was merely a lienholder

(Tr. 54).

She

continued to live in the home for a period of approximately one
year with her new husband (Tr. 7); at the time she first listed
the home for sale, she was the only signer on the listing
agreement

(Tr. 8-9); she never provided Defendant with any

opportunity for input on the listing price of the home (Tr. 12);
she instructed

the listing realtor that Defendant was not

entitled to any information concerning the listing or offers for
sale (Tr. 9, 23); and she made significant capital improvements
on the home without prior notice or consultation with Defendant
(Tr.

71).
At the time of Plaintiff's remarriage, the market value of

the home was SgS^OO.OO1

(Memorandum Decision, para. 2) and the

1

The value stated in the text represents the Court's findings. Plaintiff's expert testified
the value of the home in August, 1984 was $89,000.00 (Tr. 65; Ex. 7). Defendant's expert stated
a value of $100,000.00 (Tr. 21; Ex. 4).
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unpaid balance of the mortgage $20,304.002 (Memorandum Decision,
para. 3 ) .
Shortly after Plaintiff's remarriage, the parties attempted
to negotiate a means to pay Defendant's equity (Tr. 34-35; 1415).

However, the negotiations were unsuccessful.

Thus,

Plaintiff decided to sell the home (Tr. 35).
The home was first listed for sale in 1984 (Tr. 35).

The

listing was renewed several times and continued until an offer
was received to purchase the home in March, 1987, for $91,500.00
(Tr.

46; Ex. 1).

Plaintiff accepted the offer and sale took

place on August 13, 1987 (Ex. 1 ) .

The costs of sale were

$6,113.00 (Memo. Decision, para. 4; Ex. 1).
It was apparent that the market value of the home decreased
between August 30, 1984 (the date that Plaintiff remarried) and
August 13, 1987 (the date the home was sold) (Tr. 22, 69).
In October, 1984, one month after Plaintiff's remarriage,
and during her occupancy of the home with her new husband,
Plaintiff expended
Decision, para. 5).

$164.79

for screens on the home (Memo.

In the summer of 1986, approximately two

years after Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff expended $7,800.00
for roof repairs and reconstruction of the roof of the home
(Memo. Decision, para. 5; Tr. 38-43).

These improvements were

made by Plaintiff without any prior notice or acquiesence of
Defendant (Tr. 71).

2

The Court's finding as to the amount of the unpaid mortgage balance was taken from Exhibit
5

The decline in the real estate market between August, 1984
(date of remarriage) and August, 1987 (date of sale) more than
offsets the increase in the value of the home by reason of the
improvements made by Plaintiff (Tr. 22, 69).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point 1
(a)
debtor
costs

Costs of Improvements.

to a secured
of

creditor

improvements

made

The indebtedness of a

is not

reduced

by

the

by

debtor

to

the

the

collateral.
(b)

Costs

of

Sale.

The

wording

of

the

Decree

obligating Defendant to pay one-half of the costs of sale is
applicable

only when the sale of home

is the

event making the lien due and payable.
liable

for

costs

of

sale when

the

triggering

Defendant is not

triggering

event

is

Plaintiff's remarriage and the sale does not occur for more
than three years after the remarriage.
Point II
The Decree

of Divorce

incorporates

the provisions of an

agreement which was entered into between the parties with the
advice

of

counsel

wherein

indebtedness

was

created

without

mention of interest if the indebtedness was not paid on the date
it was due and payable.
the agreement

Furthermore, pursuant to the terms of

and Decree, Defendant had a chose in action to

enforce his lien when Plaintiff remarried inasmuch as the lien

6

was then

"forecloseable".

In both situations, Utah Code

Annotated §15-1-1 provides interest at the rate of ten percent
(10%) per annum.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR THE COSTS OF
IMPROVEMENTS MADE AFTER PLAINTIFF'S
REMARRIAGE AND COSTS OF SALE OF THE HOME
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter
provides as follows:
"Plaintiff is awarded the real
property of the marriage in the
form of a home located at 2740 East
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
subject to a lien thereon for onehalf of the equity that may be in
the h o u s e at the t i m e of
liquidation (which contemplates an
increasing equity as the value
increases). The equity is defined
as the fair market value or sales
price at the time Defendant becomes
entitled to liquidate his lien as
set forth herein, less the amount
of mortgages, costs of improvements
made by Plaintiff and costs of
sale.
This lien shall not be
forecloseable until the youngest
child reaches 18, or until the home
is sold or until Plaintiff
remarries..."
In its memorandum decision dated March 18, 1988 the lower
Court found:

(a)

The value of the home in August, 1984 (the

date Plaintiff remarried) was $95,000.00; (b)

7

The unpaid

mortgage

balance

on

the

date

of

Plaintiff's

remarriage

was

$20,304.00.
These findings establish that the total equity in the home
on the date of Plaintiff's remarriage was $74,696.00.

According

to paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, this equity should have
resulted

in Defendant

represented

receiving

the sum of

$37,348.00

one-half of the equity at the time of

which

Plaintiff's

remarriage ($74,696.00 divided by 2 equals $37,348.00).
Despite the findings as to market value and the amount of
the mortgage balance, the lower Court held that Defendant should
receive only $30,309.00.
The basis for the reduction from $37,348.00 to $30,309.00
was the Court's finding that Defendant was responsible for onehalf

of

the

replacement

costs
of

the

incurred

by

roof

the

in

Plaintiff
summer

of

in

the

1986

repair

and

($7,800.00);

application of new screens on the home on or about October 14,
1984 ($164.79); and, costs arising out of the sale of the home in
August,

1987

$14,077.78.

($6,113.00).

The

total

of

these

costs

was

One-half of these costs ($7,038.89) were assessed

against Defendant thereby reducing his share of the sale proceeds
to the figure of $30,309.11

($37,348.00 minus $7,038.89 equals

$30,309.11).
Defendant

contends

constitutes error.

that

the

assessment

of

these

costs

Each of these assessments will be discussed

separately.

8

A,

COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS
The language authorizing deduction of costs of improvements

clearly refers to improvements made prior to the date Defendant's
lien became due and payable inasmuch as the language authorizing
the deduction is prefaced by the words "at the time Defendant
becomes
apparent
after

entitled
that

the

to

liquidate

if the

lien was

his

lien".

Moreover,

language made reference to
payable,

Defendant

would

it

is

improvements

be

paying

for

improvements to Plaintiff's home with no possibility to benefit
by any increase in market value by reason of the improvements.
The roof repair and replacement of $7,800.00 was undertaken
in the summer of 1986, after the time Plaintiff remarried (Tr.
38-39).

The costs relating to the screens ($164.79) was incurred

on or about October 14, 1984, after Plaintiff's remarriage (Memo
Decision, para. 5 ) .

Both expenditures occurred while Plaintiff

was the sole owner of the home and while Defendant? s interest was
limited to his lien.
one-half

of

the

Plaintiff's claim that Defendant must bear

costs

of

these

improvements

is

not

only

inconsistent with the concept of the rights and obligations of
lienholders, but is inconsistent with Plaintiff's actions at the
time

the

improvements

improvements

without

were
any

made.

prior

Plaintiff

notice

or

undertook

consultation

the
with

Defendant (Tr. 71).
Defendant

has

found

no

authority

from

any

jurisdiction

holding that secured indebtedness is decreased by the costs of

9

improvements to the collateral.

The improvements benefit only

Utah Code Annotated §78-37-43.

the debtor.

Plaintiff's claims are made with the benefit of hindsight-knowledge that real estate values decreased after August, 1984.
It is readily apparent that if the market forces together with
the improvements had enhanced the market value of the home so
that the selling price in 1987 exceeded the 1984 market value,
Plaintiff would be claiming sole entitlement to the benefit of
the increase.4

This Court should not permit Plaintiff to compel

Defendant to bear a portion of the loss from the decline in the
market when he could not have shared in the gain had the market
increased.
B.

COSTS OF SALE
Paragraph 7 of the decree g r a n t s Defendant

a l i e n on the

home as of t h e d a t e of t h e decree (August 14, 1980).
of

the

lien

occurrence
reaches

18,

varied

of

one of
or

until

with

the

three
the

value

events:
home i s

of

the

"...the
sold,

or

The amount

home u n t i l
youngest
until

the
child

Plaintiff

remarries 1 1 .

3

Utah Code Annotated §78-37-4 clearly provides that sale proceeds from the collateral which
are in excess of the indebtedness go to the debtor if there are no junior liens.
Paragraph 7 of the decree clearly provides that Defendant benefits from increases in equity
only until Plaintiff remarries (or the occurrence of one of the other triggering events).
Defendant's share of the equity was frozen on that date. Thus, had the value of the home
increased after Plaintiff's remarriage, she would be entitled to the full amount of the increase.
Inasmuch as Defendant is precluded from sharing in any increase in value after Plaintiff's
remarriage, he should likewise be insulated from any decrease in value during the same period.
10

As previously noted, Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984.
At that time, the decree clearly states that the amount of the
lien

is then determined

and the lien is immediately

due and

payable, i.e., the lien is then "forecloseable".
If the triggering event had been sale of the home rather
than Plaintiff's remarriage, it is clear that Defendant would be
liable for a portion of the costs of sale.

However, since the

triggering event was Plaintiff's remarriage, and the debt was due
and payable on the date of the remarriage, there were no costs of
sale.

Defendant respectfully submits that it constitutes error

to allow Plaintiff's failure to timely pay the lien to result in
a decrease in the value of the lien.
In order

to equitably

determine

the parties'

respective

share of the sale proceeds, the Court must hypothetically set-up
a closing on August 30, 1984, the date that the lien became due
and payable.

One could not seriously contend that on that date

Defendant is liable for the costs of sale that would occur three
years later.

At that point in time, Plaintiff was living in the

home (Tr. 7) and a future sale with resulting selling costs would
involve pure speculation.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST
Paragraph 7 of the decree clearly states that Defendant's
lien is due and payable on the date of Plaintiff's remarriage.
This provision of the Decree was based upon a lawful agreement
11

which the parties entered into with the advice of counsel and
thereafter announced in open Court (Tr. 11-12).

This agreement

did not specifically provide for interest in the event Plaintiff
failed to timely pay the lien.

Furthermore, since Defendants

lien was "forecloseable" on the date that Plaintiff remarried,
Defendant had a "chose in action" to enforce the lien on that
date.

Finally, Plaintiff's failure to pay the lien for a period

of three years

after it was due and payable

constitutes

"forbearance" in such payment.
The Utah legislature has specifically addressed this precise
situation of a lawful contract without mention of interest, a
"chose in action" and a "forbearance" in the payment of money.
Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1 provides:
"Interest rates
Contracted rate.

- Legal

rate-

(1 )
Except when parties to a
lawful contract agree on a
specified rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods,
or chose in action shall be 10% per
annum..."
Inasmuch as the legislature has addressed the precise situation
and the statute was in full force and effect on the date of the
agreement between the parties and thereafter, and such agreement
was entered into with the benefit of counsel, the only logical
presumption is that the parties knew of the existence of the
statute and chose not to exclude its application.
It is apparent

that Defendant

exercised

restraint

in

enforcing his rights out of concern for the impact on the minor
12

children born of the marriage.

However, Defendant never waived

interest on the debt and his restraint does not alter the clear
wording of the decree that designates the time for the payment of
the lien as August 30, 1984.
It would be extremely inequitable not to assess interest in
this situation for the following reasons:
(a)

Plaintiff and her new husband lived in the home

for a period of approximately one year after Plaintiff
became obligated to pay Defendant's lien.

It would be

grossly inequitable to permit her to both free rent and no
interest on the use of the funds which were then due and
payable to Defendant.
(b)

During the period of time that Plaintiff has not

paid interest on her indebtedness to Defendant, the lien
against the home has decreased from $20,304.00 (the pay-off
amount in August, 1984) to $16,687.00 (the pay-off on the
date of the sale, Ex. 2). 5

It is inequitable to permit

Plaintiff to benefit by the decrease in the indebtedness
while, at the same time, she is excused from paying any
interest on her debt to Defendant which was due and payable
during this entire period of time.
(c)
1984,

If Defendant had asserted his rights in August,

Plaintiff would likely have had to borrow sufficient

funds to pay and discharge the lien and thereby grant a
second mortgage to the lender.
5

In such a situation,

The lower Court computed equity by deducting the $20,304 amount (Memo. Decision, para. 7).
13

Plaintiff would have been required to make monthly payments
to the second lienholder at interest rates that would have
been higher than the statutory rates.

Thus, the assessment

of interest does not prejudice Plaintiff.
(d)

If Plaintiff had paid Defendant's lien at the time

it was due and payable, Defendant could have invested the
funds and received the income therefrom.
(e)

Plaintiff

totally

excluded

Defendant

from

any

input on the terms and provisions of the sale and listing
agreement.

Inasmuch as she exercised sole dominion over the

sale of the home, and did not permit Defendant to provide in
put in the sale, she can be the only contributor in the
delay in selling the home.

Even if it be assumed, for the

sake of argument, that the long delay in sale was not the
fault of Plaintiff, the fact still remains that she had a
clear and unequivocal obligation to pay Defendant one-half
of the equity as of August 30, 1984 regardless of whether
the home was sold.
CONCLUSION
The subject

Order

entered

by

the

lower

Court

should

be

reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff as follows:
(a)

Judgment in the sum of $7,039.00 representing the

difference between the $30,309.00 awarded by the Court and
the $37,348.00 which represented the amount of Defendant's
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lien together with interest at the rate of 10% per annem
from August 30, 1984 to date of judgment;
(b)

Judgment in an amount equal to interest at the

rate of ten percent

(10%) per annum on $30,309.00 from

August 30, 1984 to the date said sum was paid.
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